Abstract This article advances a framework for understanding the political economy of the Egyptian and Arab revolts. After almost three decades of implementing neoliberal economic policies, the Egyptian economy was nevertheless stagnating in the early 2000s and political unrest was increasing. In response two key policy decisions were undertaken by the ruling elite, one to embark on a programme of further liberalisation and privatisation in the hope of attracting foreign direct investment and the other to use the global war on terror framework as a means of repressing internal dissent. While these decisions 'succeeded' in the short term, they also created the conditions which led to the uprisings.
On the critical end, the annual Arab Human Development Reports, launched in 2002 by the UN Development Programme, have painted a picture of stagnation, rapidly increasing poverty and inequality, as well as gender gap and other disparities. Alternatively, several countries in the Arab Middle East and North Africa were also described as success stories by multinational institutions, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) who repeatedly praised Tunisia and Egypt's economic performance.
1 Even after the uprisings, a columnist in the New York Times argued that economic success was behind the revolution in Egypt, since it unleashed the forces of an 'entrepreneurial middle class' 2 and made Egypt 'the eighteenth easiest nation in which to start a business' (Ayres and Macey 2011) . The reality is that there is some truth to both narratives, but that neither fully captures the course of economic development in Arab countries over the last 25 years. The explanation for the uprisings is better found in the political economy of regime consolidation than in aggregate statistics, whether one glosses them favourably or unfavourably. In addition, key policy decisions taken in the early 2000s hastened the demise of the Egyptian (and Tunisian) regimesand perhaps others to follow.
By the late 1990s and early 2000s, several countries in the Arab Middle East and North Africa, including Egypt, had reached a difficult impasse. On the one hand, their economies were stagnating, and gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates were in decline ( Figure 1 ). They had launched major programmes of economic liberalisation in the late 1970s, 1980s or early 1990s, depending on the country. Despite the results, the governments were under pressure from emerging forces inside the regimes (as well as from outside) to expand the programmes. As late as 2004, the IMF was urging 'significant acceleration of the pace of structural adjustment' in Egypt. 3 On the other hand, this process had undermined the autocratic model of power consolidation that the regimes had spent years refining, or perhaps in their minds, perfecting.
Egypt and some of the other regimes' response was twofold: first, it embarked upon further liberalisation with the primary goal of attracting foreign direct investment from Europe, North America and China, including the signing of bilateral free-trade agreements with the EU and USA and a massive programme of privatisation. Second, after the al-Qaeda attacks of 9/11, it adopted the Bush administration's framework of a 'global war on terror', enabling them to dedicate more resources to repression of escalating dissent. These two choices, however, further weakened the grip of the regime; the first causing splits in the business elite and the second alienating the educated middle-classes, with increasingly arbitrary state behaviour, lack of rule of law and rising corruption. The regimes were able to hang on for another decade, but it was clear that they were living on borrowed time. The ruling cliques of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and Husni Mubarak were finished off by the worldwide financial crisis beginning in 2008, which led to declines in foreign direct investment and a slowdown of economic growth (Brach and Loewe 2010), when there were few if any social forces to come to their defence (see below).
The rise and fall of the social contract
After independence in 1952, Egypt was a model for the populous Arab countries in combining authoritarian rule with a redistributive welfare state served by a large bureaucracy. The state owned industrial and other enterprises employing an urban workforce that provided agricultural support to the peasantry and supplied extensive subsidies for basic consumer goods. This corporatist model -called 'authoritarian populist' by political scientists -consolidated power by trading development for the political loyalty of key social forces, such as workers, peasants, professionals and others in the educated middleclass. Not all citizens accepted the tradeoff, of course; many resisted and paid a hefty price. Particularly in the early post-independence years, however, the Arab regimes built their legitimacy on aspirations for a developmental state.
The development outcomes in the Arab world were substantial. The economists James E. Rauch and Scott Kostyshak divide the region into three categories: the Arab Mediterranean (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia); Arab sub-Saharan Africa, including Yemen; and 'fuel-endowed countries', encompassing Iraq and the Gulf monarchies, as well as Algeria and Libya (Rauch and Kostyshak 2009 ).
The focus in this article is on Egypt, classified as part of the Arab Mediterranean. All the Arab Mediterranean countries are middle-income countries with similar economic structures and economic trajectories to other post-colonial middle-income countries (e.g. large peasant sector alongside urbanisation and a manufacturing-industrial sector; policy sequencing of first substantial state-led development followed by liberalisation). However, Egypt had not gone through the wave of democratisation. Also, unlike the pure 'rentier-states' in the region, they have relatively little oil and natural gas endowments and are thus more constrained in terms of expenditures. These two characteristics separate them from the remainder of the Arab Middle East and North Africa, including countries like Algeria -which otherwise had a very similar trajectory -with a large carbon endowment, and Yemen which has remained a low-income economy with little to no diversification of production structures. Taking issue with the Arab Human Development Report's dismal prognosis, Rauch and Kostyshak argue that most of these countries inherited abysmal conditions from colonial times and have nevertheless made dramatic progress. None of these regimes, however, were able to build a truly developmentalist state. Developmentalist states are able to use public investment and state expenditure to create an economy characterised by 'a set of assets based on knowledge, exploited by skilled labor' (Amsden 2001) with 'highly selective meritocratic recruitment' (Evans 1995). Key to these efforts are the establishment of a nonpoliticised bureaucracy that is able to enforce accountability and quality control on the private or mixed sector and technological upgrading that allows industry to compete on international markets. The post-independent Arab countries were able to seize the commanding heights of the economy. They raised protectionist tariffs, expanded infrastructure and undertook huge investments in human as well as physical capital development, with success in simple manufactures as well as more sophisticated and heavy industry. In almost all cases however, the development bureaucracy served primarily political goals and therefore could not enforce performance outcomes like its more technocratic counterparts in the Asian tigers.
Starting in the mid-1970s in Egypt, the authoritarian populist social contract began to unravel; along with it, the impressive developmental accomplishments began to stall and, in some cases, retreat. GDP growth rates that averaged around 6 per cent per year in the 1960s became less than 1 per cent in the 1980s. New social forces, particularly the emerging merchant-manufacturing class, increasingly pushed for using the state as an instrument of wealth accumulation rather than for redistributive or productive investment purposes. In many cases, these merchant-manufacturers had enriched themselves through mere business or kinship ties to the ruling apparatus. They exploited this proximity to become even richer in the era of structural adjustment. When some of the regimes ran into macroeconomic problems such as severe current account deficits or financial crises, the IMF, World Bank and other institutions reinforced the neoliberal message.
Fateful decisions
By the late 1990s, much of the region had gone through two decades of structural adjustment characterised by the trinity of economic liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation. The economies of most countries, however, were not growing as rapidly as hoped. 
Dahi The Political Economy of the Egyptian and Arab Revolt 50

Figure 4 Arab Mediterranean foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP), 1990-2009
Source World Development Indicators online database (data.worldbank.org). The Nazif government solved one problem while creating others, however. Arguably, it caused irreversible damage to the remaining political base of the regime. While the newer capitalists close to the regimes were beneficiaries, the dramatic opening angered many of the business elite who still had vested interests in a semblance of a national market. Signs of these conflicts can be traced through anxiety in the business press. As early 
Pyrrhic victories
The second fateful decision came shortly after 9/11, when Washington's newly aggressive neoconservative orientation presented both a threat and an opportunity. Having launched one war in Afghanistan and telegraphed another in Iraq, the Bush administration constrained the ability of regional allies to pursue independent foreign policies. On the other hand, the Arab regimes quickly learned that by casting their internal enemies as those of the USA as well, they could attract more resources to dedicate to repression. Many of the regimes projected the image of 'liberalised autocracy' by making and reversing concessions depending on the degree of internal and external pressure. Pleasing the West took the additional form of what can only be described as public relations campaigns, as regimes (and first ladies) spoke the language of civil society, anti-extremism and modernisation; all winks at the liberal sensibility.
Coupled with the heightened belligerence of the security services, the policy decisions of the political elite were clearly losing friends for the regimes. Even segments of the professional and managerial class that hitherto had been explicitly non-political began to chafe at the outlandish behaviour of the secret police in particular (see Tadros, this IDS Bulletin). The politically minded among the educated middle-classes were struck with an iron fist (see Ali, El Naggar, Ezbawy, Abd el Wahab, this IDS Bulletin). By the late 2000s, the Arab states had become virtual oligarchies with an isolated and hated ruling elite.
Understanding the political economy of regime consolidation helps one to understand the Arab revolts better than a simple focus on deprivation or economic success. In a way, the regimes succeeded in solving their immediate problems. They were accepted by the West as partners, and cast their domestic cruelty as an honourable fight against terrorism. They managed to bolster the rates of economic growth, in some cases quite significantly. But these victories proved to be pyrrhic, as the regimes also succeeded in alienating whatever social base they had left. Perhaps it would have been possible for the regimes to make other decisions, for instance, to engage in meaningful political reform and relax emergency law. They could have re-thought the model of economic development and attempted to rewrite an inclusive social contract with workers and peasants. They did not, and perhaps could not, do so. It is clear, however, that the reforms they tried to initiate after the uprisings broke out, came almost a decade too late.
The Egyptian and Arab revolts have occurred within a global context that is witnessing a general crisis of capitalism. Although the persistence of authoritarianism had been unique to the Arab world, the economic policies they employed were not. The USA has suffered the results of financialisation and structural adjustment policies have now reached the First World, with countries like Greece and Italy being subjected to harsh conditionalities and IMF monitoring. Needless to say, this current period is an opportunity to think and implement different approaches to economic development away from unfettered free markets, trade and financial flows. However, the experience of the Arab Middle Eastern economies provides global lessons for development that should be kept in mind when alternative approaches to development are discussed. First, the experience of the successful developmentalist countries shows that there should be an expanded role for the state in the economy, including active industrial policy (Chang and Grabel 2004; Amsden 2001) . However, the trajectory of the Arab states indicates that the lack of democracy in the Arab world did hurt economic development. The authoritarian regimes inhibited the establishment of horizontal (governmental checks and balances; independent judiciary) and vertical (media and popular pressure from below) accountability mechanisms (Mainwaring and Welna 2003) , which would strengthen domestic institutions. This is now seen as the main indicator for successful economic growth (Rodrik 2007) . Therefore, the path towards achieving effective human development in the Arab world and beyond must take into account strengthening democratic institutions as well as addressing social justice and economic growth. 
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